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Abstract. The term security ceremony describes a technical system ex-
tended with its human users. In this paper, we examine the inspection
ceremony for the mobile transport ticket in Denmark. We find several
security weaknesses that are ascribable to both human and computer
components of the ceremony. The main vulnerabilities are due to the de-
sign choices of how the visual inspection ceremony is organised and the
lack of information that is stored into the 2D barcode. These vulnerabili-
ties allow a ticket holder to travel up to 8 zones with a 2-zone subscription
and enable several people to travel with the same subscription. The at-
tack is significant as it can be automated, and rather modest skills are
necessary to break the inspection ceremony. We state four principles that
aim at strengthening the security of inspection ceremonies and propose
an alternative ceremony whose design is driven by the stated principles.
1 Introduction
Denmark has a modern transport infrastructure. The Danish government has
recently allocated substantial investments in infrastructure for railways, buses
and new metro lines [1]. Copenhagen, the capital with just over 700,000 in-
habitants, has one of the most advanced metro systems in the world that runs
autonomously 24 hours a day. Approximately one million people use the metro
every week [2]. Several transportation companies operate bus, metro, and train
services sharing the same ticketing system. Travellers can purchase three differ-
ent ticket formats: paper, contactless smart card, and digital app. Each ticket
format has its purchase and inspection procedures.
Travellers can purchase season tickets in digital format through a smartphone
app, which in Danish is called Mobilpendlerkort. The app enables commuters to
buy a digital subscription for a 30 up to 183 days in adjacent travel zones in
Denmark. Season tickets allow commuters to take advantage of unlimited trips
on buses, trains and metro for a discounted price. Hence, they are personal and
should be used only by the person who is registered as the user in the app.
Introducing new payment technologies goes hand in hand with designing the
corresponding process to check the validity of a ticket. There are many different
ways of how such a process could be organised. London transit, for example,
has introduced the Oyster card, which is physically checked upon entering and
before leaving buses or stations. In Denmark, the solution is different. Train
guards are going around and checking the validity of the tickets. In long distance
trains, every customer is asked to provide a ticket, in local trains and Metro
trains inspections occur often, and in buses, inspections are permitted but rarely
happen at all, although one has to display the proof of purchase to the bus
driver before entering. Also, new mobile payment technologies brings along new
challenges of adjusting existing and designing new ticket inspection ceremonies.
Nowadays, the inspection ceremony must also work for digital tickets including
those printed on paper or displayed on a mobile phone’s screen. Inspectors may
use barcode scanning technology or use other means to assess the validity of a
ticket.
In this paper, we investigate the security ceremony that involves the inspec-
tion of the mobile transport tickets. According to Ellison [3], the term ceremony
refers to a technical system extended with its human users. Security ceremony
analysis, also known as socio-technical security analysis, is an area of research
that has been initiated only recently although it is widely accepted that security
incidents usually bootstrap from social engineering practices. Those practices
target the weakest link in the security chain, namely, the user. The idea behind
the socio-technical security analysis is to combine computer security and social
sciences into an interdisciplinary approach that brings the human in the context
of information security analysis. Recently, a socio-technical attack has been car-
ried out against UK rail tickets [4]. BBC reporters bought forged rail tickets on
the dark web. Although the tickets appeared genuine, magnetic strips were not
accepted by the barriers. However, train guards let BBC reporters through the
barriers at all occasions without asking any questions.
In a similar vein, we conduct our security analysis considering both human
and computer components involved in the inspection ceremony. Our findings
include an attack, which would allow a malicious commuter to exploit weaknesses
in the app and the inspection ceremony to ride trains, buses, and metro in
Denmark for free. If carefully orchestrated, the attack can elude post-processing
inspection analysis attempting to detect fraudulent activities and may affect
railway companies: the prices of a personal season ticket range from a minimum
of 375 kroner (50 euros), for one month covering 2 zones, to a maximum of
32099 kroner (4315 euros), for three months covering 28 zones in first class.
The cost depends on multiple factors such as period, travel class, the number
of travel zones, and type of ticket. Our work in this paper makes the following
contributions:
– We detail the security analysis of the inspection ceremony of digital season
tickets and reports some security weaknesses that enable a concrete attack
to the ceremony. Since there are no publicly available specifications of the
ceremony, we build the ceremony via a three-phase analysis (observation,
interaction, validation) of the procedures that train guards follow during
an inspection. For a similar reason, we decode the barcode printed into the
Mobilpendlerkort to gain the encoded data.
– We advance four principles to transport operators aimed at improving the
security design of the tickets. We formulate our principles on the basis of the
outcome of our ceremony analysis and findings. It follows that the principles
are specifically devised for the ticket inspection ceremony but can be further
generalised and applied to other socio-technical contexts.
– We propose an alternative inspection ceremony that is aimed at strengthen-
ing the security of the inspection procedure. The design of the alternative
ceremony is driven by our principles. While it provides stronger security
guarantees, it is simpler than the original ceremony.
Outline. Section 2 describes the Mobilpendlerkort app and the inspection cere-
mony; section 3 details the steps that enable the attack to the ceremony; section
4 outlines four principles for the design of ticket inspection ceremony; section
5 details an alternative ceremony that mitigates the attack in the original one;
section 6 discusses related work; finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Ceremony Description
The inspection ceremony is pivoted on the elements provided by the Mobilpendler-
kort app and on how the train guard interprets these elements. The user installs
the app and purchases a season ticket. The train guard is expected to execute
the inspection ceremony according to the details of the season ticket available
in the app.
Fig. 1. A screenshot of the
primary screen (personal
details are hidden)
Fig. 2. A screenshot of the
secondary screen
Fig. 3. A screenshot of the
primary screen with an ex-
tra zone ticket
2.1 Description of Mobilpendlerkort
The Mobilpendlekort app is available for mobile devices running iOS or Android
operating systems. It is published by DSB, the largest train operating company
in Scandinavia. We consider the latest available version (3.01) that is available
at the time of writing this paper. Both iOS and Android versions of the Mo-
bilpendlerkort implement the same functionalities. Hence, the security issues
and the principles later described in this paper apply to both versions of the
app.
Once the app is installed, it requires the commuter to enter the mobile phone
number. The app generates a subscription number (stamkortnr) that is bound
to both device and phone number. If the commuter changes device or phone
number, the app generates a new subscription number, hence former season
ticket cannot be restored, and the commuter should purchase a new season ticket.
To purchase a season ticket, the commuter provides her personal details (i.e.,
name, surname, and birth date), chooses the starting and ending dates, and the
desired travel zones. After payment, the app downloads and installs the ticket,
which is represented via two screens. The primary screen is intended for visual
inspection and includes an animated visual watermark. The secondary screen
is intended for computer inspection and includes a 2D barcode that encodes a
digital signature on the ticket data. An instance of a valid ticket is depicted in
Figures 1 and 2, which show the primary and secondary screens, respectively.
The center of the primary screen displays the valid travel zones and the time
interval for which the ticket is valid. In the lower-right corner, the screen displays
the personal details of the commuter, the type of the ticket (i.e., young, adult,
or senior), the number of zones and the number of days included in the subscrip-
tion, the purchase price, and the subscription number. In the lower-left area
of the primary screen there is the animated visual watermark that is intended
to provide visual assurance about the authenticity of the app. The secondary
screen displays the phone number of the commuter, the ticket number, and a 2D
barcode, specifically an Aztec type of barcode, which is the de facto standard
for mobile transport tickets. A new ticket number is generated whenever the
subscription is renewed. The Aztec barcode contains most of the data displayed
on the primary screen and the respective digital signature. Section 3 provides a
detailed description of the content of the barcode.
The app also allows commuters to purchase additional extra zone tickets that
extend the number of travel zones temporarily. Extra zone tickets are visually
stapled on the primary screen. For instance, the extra zone ticket in Figure 3
allows the commuter to travel to one additional zone, namely, any of the zones
that are adjacent to the zones already included in the subscription. It is possible
to purchase extra zone tickets for up to 8 additional zones.
2.2 Building the Inspection Ceremony
There is no available public specification for the inspection ceremony of trans-
port tickets in Denmark. Thus, we derived the steps that form the ceremony
empirically. The procedure to build the ceremony included three phases. In the
observation phase, we observed how train guards interact with the app, either
when a valid or invalid ticket (i.e., expired, with wrong zones or personal de-
tails) is checked. We noted the behaviours of train guards on metro and trains
in the Copenhagen metropolitan area. On buses, we observed the inspection
done by bus drivers. The output of this phase was a preliminary draft version
of the ceremony. The draft served as input to the interaction phase in which we
interacted with train guards to refine the structure of the ceremony when they
checked our valid tickets. For example, we asked the train guard to execute a full
inspection. We found that the inspection ceremony varies according to the mean
of transport and the cost of the ticket. For example, guards on metro and buses
are not equipped with scanners that can check barcodes, hence those guards can
only proceed with the visual inspection. Also, we realised that guards check ID
documents on metro rides either randomly or if they believe that the personal
details displayed on the primary screen of the app do not match with the mobile
phone holder (e.g., the app reports a typical female first name but the holder
is a male). Then, we moved to the validation phase, in which we asked the IT
security department at DSB to confirm about the correctness of the ceremony.
DSB personnel confirmed that steps outlined in the ceremony are correct, while
they preferred not to comment whether the ceremony comprises other steps that
we have not observed empirically. More details about DSB response are outlined
in Section 4.
Figure 4 summarises the various steps required for mobile ticket inspection,
which unfolds as follows. Upon request of the train guard, the commuter shows
the primary screen of the ticket along with an authentic and valid ID document.
The train guard visually checks the authenticity of the primary screen provided
by the animated visual watermark, image background, and font of the text.
The train guard then checks the validity of dates and zones reported on the
ticket. For short rides, such as metro rides, or in rush hours, the train guard
may decide to conclude the inspection and consider the ticket valid. Earlier
successful conclusions of the ceremony are depicted with dashed lines in Figure
4. Otherwise, the train guard may check that the personal details of the ID
document match name, surname, and birth date reported in the primary screen.
During the last step of the inspection ceremony, the train guard checks the
validity of the barcode using an hand-held scanner, which is equipped with the
verification key to validate the signature. The device emits a green light if the
verification is successful and a red light otherwise.
It is clear that ticket inspection is a socio-technical procedure as it involves
actions and decisions from both human and computer components. It follows that
the security of such procedure depends on elements ascribable to human users
(i.e., the train guard), computer technology (i.e. the app and the scanner), and
the interaction among them. As we shall see later, this observation is important
as it leads to the finding of security weaknesses and provides grounds for the
security principles.
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Fig. 4. The inspection ceremony executed by the train guard
3 Attack Demonstration
This section describes an attack that exploits the security weaknesses of the
inspection ceremony. To describe the attack, we first report the procedure leading
to evidence of weaknesses on the generation of the barcode. Then, we discuss
how to forge the primary screen to break the inspection ceremony by combining
the forged primary screen with the barcode.
2355 5430 3131 3138 3630 3030 3031 302c #UT011186000010,
0214 5956 7dd8 d027 7442 2195 7282 c7a4 ..YV}..’tB..r...
93b6 520a 91ea 0214 1545 dea3 11ce 0f3f ..R......E.....?
1e40 74b1 e0a0 0694 89dc a204 0000 0000 .@t.............
3032 3734 78da 6591 cd6e c240 0c84 5f65 0274x.e..n.@.._e
cf88 a2f1 7aff 9243 254a 228a e080 4a38 ....z..C%J"...J8
c005 454a 0ebd a455 daf7 57ed 5085 adea ..EJ...U..W.P...
db67 7bc6 93cd f9f6 5aaf 2b10 e099 2805 .g{.....Z.+...(.
2a42 b43e c164 0546 b4a0 488e e1ba b61f *B.>.d.F..H.....
ceb7 e6b0 be88 c815 fcb6 692c 6023 204c ..........i,‘# L
b22a c5d5 e945 3081 88b4 4fa7 ef76 e8da .*...E0...O..v..
b133 c75a 48fa 08ba 179a dd66 5f37 b0f0 .3.ZH......f_7..
6aa6 2da7 21c4 45bc c8aa d66e 2f87 6ab7 j.-....E...n/.j.
2d8d 2680 4623 d996 1289 f9ec c588 e633 -.&.F#.........3
f02b 4403 94ea eded a3ef 5648 06a4 fde8 .+D.......VH....
dd14 5407 0bc4 fba9 998a 9c02 320a a49b ..T.........2...
8552 71fd 187a 433a 8d94 eb03 cb4d 686c .Rq..zC:.....Mhl
d8a7 67c4 bf18 d8fd 7390 97e5 3c4f 0869 ..g.....s...<O.i
262b 0952 364b d997 aa7e 2c0d 2d0d 3f32 &+.R6K...˜,.-.?2
4fbf 2007 ca61 cae2 7f81 f575 c451 2a1d O. ..a.....u.Q*.
c7f7 2f53 edf7 c441 0fdc 6d16 521c fd12 ../S...A..m.R...
f801 c940 720a 04 ...@r..
Fig. 5. Raw data encoded in the 2D barcode. The sequence 302c 0214 reveals the
header of the signature. The sequence 78da reveals the header of a compressed payload.
3.1 Barcode Analysis
The first step for the analysis of the barcode content is to get the raw data cod-
ified in the barcode. There are many barcode decoders available on the Internet
that can recover data from barcodes, e.g., ZXing, WebQR. Figure 5 shows the
raw data encoded in the barcode contained in the secondary screen of Figure 2.
The first 14 bytes are reserved for the header of the ticket. The presence of the
string “#UT” in the header confirms that the structure of the barcode follows
the UIC 918-3 standard [5], which prescribes the use of public key cryptography.
Information about the verification keys used by DSB and most popular train op-
erators in Europe are publicly available for download [6]. The header is followed
by a digital signature that is generated using DSA-SHA1 (1024-160).
Most of the data encoded in the barcode is the payload, which is compressed
into zlib format. Since only the content of the payload is signed, it is important
that it contains as much information as possible about the ticket to prevent its
forgery.
U_HEAD0100531186 19672580 0307201714304daenU_TLAY010493RCT200270001010
300003DSB0018011100011Standard
PE0118010600006TICKET020501040000411860301011200012GYLDIG:
2017025801050000501pe060101110001105.0700:00065201110001104.0801:
000754010100001*0703010100001*0709010100001*0760010100001
*0613010900009Zone10010713010100001*0632010200002->
0732010200002->0634010900009Zone10030734010100001
*066801010000120768010100001*0801011100011Zoner:1,
309010100000001001010000000110101000000012010250000001352010800008
PrisDKK1361011000010****375,00
U_HEAD0100531186 19563184 2706201722084daenU_TLAY010492RCT200270001010
300003DSB0018011100011Standard
PE0118010600006TICKET020501040000411860301011200012GYLDIG:
2017025801050000501pe060101110001128.0600:00065201110001103.0801:
000754010100001*0703010100001*0709010100001*0760010100001
*0613010900009Zone10030713010100001*0632010200002->
0732010200002->0634010900009Zone10040734010100001
*066801010000120768010100001*0801011000010Zoner:3,
409010100000001001010000000110101000000012010250000001352010800008
PrisDKK1361011000010****450,00
Fig. 6. The payload of the two tickets. The differences between the two payloads are
in bold. There is no mention of the personal details of the commuters.
Since the structure of digital tickets is not open source, we derived it using
a differential analysis approach. We purchased different season tickets and stud-
ied how the respective payloads differ. In so doing, we were able to isolate the
elements that form the structure of the digital ticket, for example, the purchase
date, the price, etc. This approach led to an interesting finding. We considered
two season tickets for the same travel zones but having different personal details,
starting, and ending dates. We expected that the different key information be-
tween the tickets should be reflected on the payload. Figure 6 highlights the data
of the two payloads. As expected, we found that the payload includes informa-
tion about the ticket number, purchase date and time, ticket type, travel zones,
and purchase price. Surprisingly, the personal details of the commuter cannot be
found in the payload. This means that the authenticity of the personal details
reported in the primary screen only relies on the unforgeability of that screen.
3.2 Primary Screen Forgery
The primary screen should be usable, namely the visual inspection should not
take too long to evaluate the authenticity of the data reported on the screen.
On the other hand, any alteration of the screen should be noticeable to the
train guard at visual inspection. We note that the unforgeability of the primary
screen mainly depends on fonts, the position of the text, background image, and
animated visual watermark. As expected, the animation has complex elements
that make the animation difficult to reproduce.
Fig. 7. A screenshot of a
complete empty forged pri-
mary screen as template
Fig. 8. A screenshot of the
forged primary screen as
template
Fig. 9. A screenshot of the
forged primary screen filled
with a placeholder name
Unfortunately, the primary screen can be forged in few steps and, most im-
portantly, once the background and the visual watermark are reproduced, the
forgery can be automated. We observe that no text overlays the visual water-
mark, hence the latter can be obtained by recording a video of the primary screen
on the phone (Quicktime can capture iPhone screens). Then, the resulting video
can be converted into a GIF image to facilitate editing. We also observe that
only name, surname, and birth date need to be edited because other informa-
tion is sealed into the signature encoded in the barcode. It follows that only a
small portion of the background needs to be edited and replaced with the desired
name, surname, and birth date, although a complete empty primary screen can
be easily obtained (Figure 7). This makes the forgery procedure even easier than
expected: there is no need for a dedicated app, a GIF image is sufficient to make
a successful forgery.
The last step needed to complete the forgery is to use the correct font. Any
online font identifier can recognise the font, which in this case is RobotoSlab
Regular. Figure 8 shows a screenshot of a forged primary screen that can be used
as a template to create several primary screens with different personal details
automatically. Figure 9 depicts the template filled with placeholder details.
The attack is carried out by combining the secondary screen with a forged
primary screen. In fact, even if the train guard checks the ticket holder’s ID
document, she may end up accepting the forged digital ticket.The attack breaks
the inspection ceremony in both its human and computer components. It takes
advantage of poor security choices in the design of the primary screen breaking
the visual inspection on the screen (human component). The attack exploits the
naive generation of the signature encoded in the barcode to pass the electronic
check (computer component) of the secondary screen.
One may note that post-processing systems will eventually identify the con-
current use of a forged digital ticket, and annul it. Still, a forged digital ticket
can be successfully used at different times of the day by different people. The
attack is very effective if orchestrated carefully. A more sophisticated version
would be to purchase a season ticket with many travel zones and take advan-
tage of the reduced price due to the incremental discount rate. The ticket would
be distributed among several commuters that travel to different zones. In this
case, the forged digital ticket can be implemented into a dedicated app that
allows users to report when a forged digital ticket is scanned. This sophisticated
version would be particularly virulent: fraudsters can coordinate the issue of
forged digital tickets, minimising the risk that post-processing systems identify
the concurrent or suspicious use of the tickets.
3.3 Extra zone ticket forgery
Forging the extra zone ticket is even easier than the primary screen as there is no
need to forge the app at all in this case. Less than one person-day of effort was
needed to make an Android floating app that overlaps the primary screen of the
Mobilpendlerkort. A floating app is an application that opens in a window and
floats over all other applications allowing multitasking on a device. A popular use
of floating apps are the chat heads of messaging apps like Facebook Messenger.
In our case, the floating app consists of a fake extra zone ticket with a countdown
timer that simulates the remaining validity time of the ticket. Our app does not
float freely but sticks to the primary screen.
The extra zone ticket forgery is effective because the barcode does not change
when extra zone tickets are purchased and takes advantage of the poor security
design of the ticket in the primary screen to attack the visual inspection (human
component).
4 Principles
Upon the basis of our findings, we formulate four principles that form the founda-
tion for our proposed solution. The first principle focuses on differences between
paper and mobile tickets.
Principle 1 The security design of paper tickets should not influence the secu-
rity design of electronic tickets.
Often, look and feel of traditional systems tend to be copied in their electronic
counterpart. This is a natural design choice because it takes advantage of the
preexisting familiarity that stakeholders have with the system: it minimises end-
user confusion caused by the introduction of electronic components; it allows
system developers to get immediate correctness feedback from a system they
already know well. With a security take, this approach should be practised more
cautiously, prioritising secure by design principles when possible. For instance,
it is mistakenly believed that a digital animation image gives the same degree
of authenticity to mobile tickets as watermarks give to paper tickets. In our
setting, the forged digital ticket is a clear example of how a pre-existing (working)
approach in the traditional system influences the electronic one negatively.
Principle 2 Computer inspection should be prioritised over visual inspection.
An immediate consequence of Principle 1 is that computer components should
not be seen as add-ons that follow the traditional inspection ceremony. Train
guards are used to that a successful visual inspection signifies that the ticket is
valid. Habits are hard to eradicate, especially when traditional and electronic sys-
tems coexist, as in the case for transport tickets. The human-then-computer cer-
emony may lead train guards to execute only the traditional inspection ceremony
and consider mobile tickets valid when they are not. Designing a computer-then-
human ceremony would result in train guards to diverge from the traditional
ceremony, fostering awareness of the different inspection ceremonies.
When possible, it is also advisable to intertwine human and computer com-
ponents in the inspection ceremony. A closer look at the inspection ceremony in
Figure 4 reveals an additional issue due to the separation of human and com-
puter components. The last check validates the signature of a payload that is
unintelligible to the human because the payload is encoded as a 2D barcode.
The payload may contain different data respect to the information reported in
the primary screen, and the output of the scanner (i.e., green or red light) is not
sufficient to the train guard to check whether the payload actually encodes the
same data as in the primary screen.
Principle 3 The inspection ceremony should enable the verification of ticket key
information either electronically or manually.
Maintaining information in electronic form has many advantages, such as quick
and human-errorless ticket verification. However, it is necessary that all key
information is considered for checking. Complete information may not be avail-
able due to intentional or unintentional computer malfunctions. For example,
scanners may not work properly during the inspection. It is desirable that the
inspection ceremony provides the strongest possible security guarantees to both
electronic and manual verification procedures. For example, the ceremony would
benefit from practices such as data redundancy and data duplication. Both prac-
tices prompt verification procedures to have access to the necessary data and
would help to avoid weaknesses such as the exclusion of commuter personal
details from the payload of the barcode.
Principle 4 Security should be preferred over usability in the design of visual
inspection of an electronic ticket.
The rationales underlying this principle are twofold. First, it comes from the
observation that a ticket is not a receipt. The goal of a transport ticket is to
prove to the train guard that the holder has a certain right, while the goal of
a receipt is to prove to the holder that ticketing system received the money. A
common mistake is not to separate concerns, for example, separate tickets with
receipts. The design of a ticket demands security and usability towards the train
guard while the design of receipt focuses on usability towards the ticket holder.
The effort in balancing those conflicting requirements may lead to compromises
and may introduce security weaknesses, which can be easily avoided by designing
ticket and receipt separately.
Secondly, electronic tickets are more suitable for computer inspection than
visual inspection, hence it is easier to guarantee the security of the inspection
via computer components rather than human components. The security of visual
inspection cannot be taken for granted, and visual assurance elements should be
carefully designed to maximise security, sacrificing usability if necessary. The
following design advice list aims at maximising the security of visual inspection.
– Prefer complex, large, and dynamic visual watermarks over simple, small,
and static ones to mitigate forgery.
– Superimpose critical information and visual watermark to prevent data al-
teration.
– Display the current time to ensure liveness.
– Display visual watermarks across the screens to evidence screen correlation.
Of course, the list contains elements that may negatively affect the usability of
the ceremony. However, we observe that this is not a real issue since train guards
are expected to be specifically trained to perform a visual inspection. This is an
additional element in support of prioritising security over usability in the design
of visual inspection.
5 Alternative inspection ceremony
We propose a new inspection ceremony inspired by the principles outlined above.
Where possible, we reuse the components of the actual ceremony. We believe that
the reuse of existing components will reduce the need of training for train guards,
hence will favour a faster adoption of the new ceremony.
Figure 10 shows the steps of the alternative inspection ceremony. A main
pillar of the alternative ceremony is to prioritise computer inspection over visual
inspection, as advocated in Principle 2. The primary screen is replaced with
a barcode screen, that contains the Aztec barcode, which should encode zones,
dates, and personal details of the commuter. This enables the verification of all
ticket key information electronically as suggested in Principle 3. The hand-held
scanner checks the barcode and, if the signature is valid, it shows the content of
the payload (i.e., zones, dates, and personal details) on the screen of the scanner.
The train guard now checks the validity of zones and dates by looking at the
screen of the scanner. The last step consists of checking whether the personal
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Fig. 10. The proposed inspection ceremony
details displayed on the screen of the scanner match with the details reported
on the ID document.
The proposed inspection ceremony is simpler than the original one. The app
needs only one screen to represent the ticket. This is possible by taking advan-
tage of the screen on the scanner. The visual inspection now takes place on a
device controlled by transport companies rather than on the commuter’s device,
which provides only the elements for computer inspection. Thus, the alternative
inspection ceremony minimises the attack surface due to forged digital tickets
on the human visual inspection. The proposed design provides more security
guarantees in case of an earlier successful conclusion of the ceremony. The scan-
ner does not emit light to signal the outcome of the verification anymore, hence
the train guard needs to validate travel zones and dates, whose authenticity is
provided by the digital signature encoded in the barcode. Although an earlier
successful conclusion of the proposed ceremony does not ensure that the holder
has the right to travel with that digital ticket, it still guarantees that the ticket
is valid. Conversely, an early successful conclusion of the original ceremony does
not give any guarantees about the validity digital ticket, which might be forged.
An additional element in support of the proposed inspection is that it helps the
post-processing analysis as each ticket inspection entails ticket scanning. The
device can store the data collected on each scan, which is eventually sent to
the post-processing systems as it happens with tickets in the form of contactless
smart cards.
A secondary screen might still be necessary in the event that an hand-held
scanner is unavailable. The animation image displayed on that screen should be
replaced by a more robust form of digital watermark as suggested by the elements
listed in Principle 1. It is important to stress that the ceremony should lead the
train guard to look at this screen only under exceptional circumstances. This
justifies the use of a more sophisticated and secure form of digital watermark at
the cost of a slower visual inspection. The security of the alternative inspection
ceremony is not proven, and it would be interesting to use formal approaches to
appreciate the security of both original and proposed ceremonies.
Responsible disclosure. We notified DSB as soon as we completed the security
analysis of the inspection ceremony and found the security weaknesses. DSB
examined our report and started reviewing the Mobilpendlerkort app. However,
at the time of writing this paper, no new version of the app has been released.
While DSB personnel confirmed that all the steps depicted in the inspection
ceremony are correct, they preferred not to comment whether the ceremony
comprises other steps that we have not observed empirically. For example, we
would have been interested to know whether the scanner can remotely check a
ticket online. If so, it is essential to know what data is exchanged between the
scanner and the remote server. The presence of the digital signature into the
barcode suggests that the scanner makes an oﬄine check.
6 Related Work
Ceremony analysis has been increasingly studied as a way to better understand
the security issues of real-world systems. Radke et al. [7] investigated strengths
and weaknesses of ceremony analysis. Bella and Coles-Kemp [8] advanced a
model in support of the socio-technical analysis of security termed the cere-
mony concertina. Johansen and Jøsang [9] proposed a probabilistic modelling
of humans based on the ceremony concertina. Probst et al. [10] have recently
discussed different approaches to modelling and analysing socio-technical sys-
tems formally. In our case, the approach to the ceremony analysis is informal.
However, we believe that our case study would benefit from formal approaches
and that new security issues might be found.
Garcia et al. [11] reverse engineered and made a cryptoanalysis of the MI-
FARE Classic card, a major player in contactless smart card market, with a
strong presence in public transport systems. They found two attacks that al-
lowed an intruder to get the secret key of a card. MIFARE Classic card could
be cloned in under a second. Differently from our work, they exploit a security
vulnerability of the cryptographic primitive of the authentication protocol. Mur-
doch et al. [12] attacked “Chip and Pin” cards issued by the EMV (Europay,
MasterCard, Visa) consortium. They were able to make a successful transaction
with a stolen card without knowing the PIN. They exploited the fact that the
PIN verification step is never explicitly authenticated. In so doing, they were
able to build a man-in-the-middle attack using a few hardware components and
a fake card.
E-ticketing insecurity traces back to Schneier [13], which explained how easy
was to fly on someone else’s ticket by changing the name on the e-ticket boarding
pass printed out at home. More recently, Jaroszewski [14] created a fake boarding
pass app to enter airline lounges. Instead of generating the boarding pass, the
app generates a barcode that is based on the flight number, and that can then
be scanned at the entrance to lounges. The fake barcode worked because it was
generated without any cryptographic authentication mechanism so unmanned
automatic scanners could not check properly the eligibility of the passenger. This
case is complementary to the case studied in our paper in which the involvement
of human user (i.e., the train guard) might be harmful to the security of the
system.
7 Conclusions
The socio-technical approach to the security analysis allowed us to find the
security weaknesses that lead to the attacks. The contribution of this work is
not in the attacks that we have identified but in the principles we have derived
from our observation for the design of security ceremony. Building a security
ceremony is not a straightforward task. There is no standard notation or known
guideline that prescribes the right formalism to represent the flow of information
in a security ceremony. The presence of human users further complicates the
construction of the ceremony. In our case, we decided to use flowcharts because
they provide a simple and clear graphical description, and naturally describe the
heterogeneous protocol where users and computers are the players. The presence
of the human component also complicates the design of a security ceremony.
Human users tend to take shortcuts as in the case of earlier successful conclusions
of the ceremony. With a security take, the shortcuts should be reduced as much
as possible and, ideally, eradicated.
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